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I. INTRODUCTION

a.

Nature of the Case.

This is the opening brief of the Appellant, Idaho Transportation Department.
This is a consolidated appeal from two separate administrative actions of the Idaho
Department of Transportation in regard to Mr. Trottier' s driving privileges. The Department
suspended Mr. Trottier's driving privileges pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A, Supreme Court Case
39994-2012, that suspension is referred to herein as the Administrative License Suspension
(ALS).
Additionally,

Mr.

Trottier

has

Commercial

Driving

Privileges

which

were

administratively disqualified pursuant to I.C. § 49-335, Supreme Court Case 39949-2012, that
proceeding is referred to as the Commercial Driver's License Disqualification (CDL DQ).
b.

Party References.

The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for purposes of
this argument. Mr. Trottier is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" is used, it is in
reference to a hypothetical or to drivers generally.
II. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE - ALS
a.

Factual Statement.

On September 3, 2011 at 0214 hours Idaho State Police Trooper Schwecke was patrolling
north bound on U.S. Highway 95 in the city limits of Moscow, Idaho and observed a red GMC
Jimmy conduct a right hand turn from C Street onto Highway 95 failing to properly maintain his
lane of travel and driving on top of the lane divider and hash marks for approximately 20 to 30
feet.
Trooper Schwecke activated his emergency overhead lights and conducted a traffic stop.
Idaho State Police Corporal Baldwin assisted.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Upon approaching the vehicle and informing the driver of the reason for the stop,
Trooper Schwecke could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. The
driver, later identified as William R. Trottier, had glassy and bloodshot eyes.
Mr. Trottier admitted to having a couple of beers and Trooper Schwecke asked Mr.
Trottier to perform standardized field sobriety tests.
Mr. Trottier performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, the Walk and Tum and One Leg
Stand tests and failed the tests.

Trooper Schwecke informed Mr. Trottier that he would be

detained for suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Trooper Schwecke initiated a 15 minute monitoring period and obtained breath samples
from Mr. Trottier receiving alcohol breath test results of .148 and .144. Trooper Schwecke then
arrested Mr. Trottier and Mr. Trottier was transported to the Latah County Jail (R. pp. 032-033).

b.

Procedural History.
Mr. Trottier asked the Idaho Transportation Department for a hearing on a proposed

Administrative License Suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7) for his failure of an
evidentiary test for breath alcohol concentration. The Department's Hearing Examiner, Skip
Carter determined that the requirements for suspension of Mr. Trottier's driving privileges set
forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A were complied with and Mr. Trottier should have his driving
privileges suspended for ninety days as a result of failing an evidentiary test for alcohol
concentration.
Mr. Trottier requested that the District Court review the decision of the Department's
Administrative Hearing Examiner.
Upon Judicial Review, the District Court set aside the decision of the Department's
Hearing Examiner, concluding that Mr. Trottier demonstrated that the stop of his vehicle was not

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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supported by legal cause.
The Department timely filed its appeal.

c.

Reference to the Administrative Record.
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the Appellate

Record page number not the Administrative Record page number.

The Transcript of the

Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal as an exhibit. The transcript of that
hearing is referred to as the Administrative License Suspension Transcript (ALS Tr.) by page
and number. A video recording of the circumstances of the administration of breath alcohol
testing was made an Exhibit to the Administrative Record and is referred to as ALS Exhibit A.

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE- CDL
a.

Factual Statement and Procedural History.
Mr. Trottier was notified on September 13, 2011 that the Idaho Transportation

Department intended to disqualify him from the continued operation of Commercial Motor
Vehicles for life as a result of several failures of evidentiary testing for breath alcohol (CDL DQ
R. p. 022).

Mr. Trottier timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of Transportation's
Hearing Examiner (CDL DQ R. pp. 025-026) on the proposed Commercial Driver's License
Disqualification.
A hearing was held telephonically on October 11, 2011 (CDL DQ R. p. 029).
Mr. Trottier timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review (CDL DQ R. pp. 047-048).
Upon the District Court setting aside the ALS, the CDL DQ was also set aside (CDL DQ
R. p. 129-131).
The Department timely filed its appeal.
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b.

Reference to the Administrative Record.

The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the Appellate
Record page number not the CDL DQ Administrative Record page number. The Transcript of
the CDL DQ Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal as an exhibit and is
referred to as the CDL DQ Transcript.
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. ALS

1. The District Court erred when it determined that Mr. Trottier had met his burden to show
that legal cause did not exist for the stop of Mr. Trottier.
B. CDL DQ

1. The CDL DQ is appropriate pursuant to LC. § 49-335.
V.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing
Examiner that driving privileges should be reinstated because:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or;
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or
18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was
administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.
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The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension of
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp., 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 at 143 (Ct.

App. 2003).
The disqualification of Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges is addressed in Idaho Code
§ 49-335(4):

A person is disqualified for the period of time specified in 49 CFR part 3 83 if
found to have committed two (2) or more of any of the offenses specified in
subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or any combination of those offenses, arising
from two (2) or more separate incidents. 1
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for judicial
review. Idaho Code§ 67-5277.

1

Idaho Code§ 49-335 (I) & (2) provides:
(I) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's
license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one
(I) year if convicted in the form of a judgment or withheld judgment of a first violation under any
state or federal law of:
(a) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance;
(b) Operating a commercial motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration of the person's
blood, breath or bodily substance is 0.04 or more;
(c) Leaving the scene of an accident involving a motor vehicle driven by the person;
(d) Using a motor vehicle in the commission of any felony;
(e) Operating a commercial motor vehicle when the person's class A, B or C commercial
driver's license driving privileges were revoked, suspended or canceled, or during a time
when such person was disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle, if the
reason for such revocation, suspension, cancellation or disqualification was the result of a
violation that occurred while the person was operating a commercial motor vehicle;
(f) Causing a fatality through negligent operation of a commercial motor vehicle,
including, but not limited to, the crimes of motor vehicle manslaughter, homicide by
motor vehicle and negligent homicide.
(2) Any person who operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C driver's
license is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a period of not less than one
(I) year if the person refuses to submit to or submits to and fails a test to determine the driver's
alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances concentration while operating a motor vehicle.

See also Appendix 1, copy of 49 CFR 3 83 .51
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Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Howard

v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P. 2d 709 (1996).
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) provides:
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless
the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is: " ... if
the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in paii and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code § 67-5279(3).
The decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed unless the order violates
statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made upon unlawful
procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion, Marshall v. Department of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (2002). The party
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Druffel v.

State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 41P.3d739 (2002).
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the
agency record independently of the District Court's decision", Marshall v. Dept. of Transp. 137

Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002).
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V.ARGUMENT
A. The Administrative License Suspension
The District Court erred when it determined that Mr. Trottier had met his burden to show
that legal cause did not exist for the stop of Mr. Trottier.
I.C. § 18-8002A(7) requires that the driver show that there was no legal cause to stop the
vehicle operated by him.

The Department's Hearing Examiner concluded that legal cause

existed to stop Mr. Trottier for a violation of I.C. § 49-644(1) or a violation of I.C. § 49-637 for
failing to maintain its lane of traffic. 2
The appellate court reviews the Hearing Examiner's Decision independently of the
District Court to determine whether Mr. Trottier met his burden before the Department's Hearing
Examiner. 3

2

I.C. 49-644(1) provides:
The driver of a vehicle intending to tum shall do so as follows: Both the approach for a right tum
and the right tum shall be made as close as practicable to the right-handed curb or edge of the
roadway.

3

In reviewing the district court, this Court examines the county board of commissioners' record independently of
the district court's decision. Marcia T Turner, L.L. C. v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 207, 159 P. 3d 840, 844
(2007). A reviewing court must affirm the county board of commissioners' action unless the board's decision (a)
violates statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the statutory authority of the board; (c) is made upon
unlawful procedure; (d) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 208, 159 P.3d at 845; I.C. § 67-5279(3).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

7

The Department's Hearing Examiner's findings as to the existence of legal cause for the
stop are supported by substantial evidence in the Record as a whole. 4
The Hearing Examiner concluded that the video recording of the circumstances of the
stop of Mr. Trottier (ALS Exhibit A) demonstrates that Mr. Trottier's vehicle made "a wide turn
crossing over both of the dashed lane dividers" (R. p. 036 Finding 1.2). Such a fact is clearly
observable by viewing ALS Exhibit A. 5
Mr. Trottier simply asks the Court to come to a conclusion different from that made by
the Hearing Examiner considering the same information. Here, the Hearing Examiner did not
hear from Mr. Trottier as to his driving. There is no differing testimony which the Hearing
Officer is required to weigh, Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 206 P.3d 505
(Ct.App. 2009). Mr. Trottier simply argues without supporting testimony that the Affidavit of

Trooper Schwecke and the video recording is insufficient to support a finding that legal cause
did not exist to stop Mr. Trottier's vehicle.

1.
Was There Legal Cause to Stop the Vehicle Driven By The Petitioner?
I.

2.

3.

Officer Schwecke stopped the vehicle driven by Trottier on September 3, 2011 at approximately 0214 hours
in Latah County, Idaho for an illegal turn, in violation of Idaho Code, § 49-644, and for failing to maintain
its lane of travel, in violation of Idaho Code,§ 49-637.
Counsel for Trottier argues that no traffic violation can be discerned from a viewing of the driving on video
recording. However, only part of the driving pattern occurs within view of the camera on the recording.
Additionally, what can be see appears to be a wide turn, crossing over the dashed lane dividers. The paint
on the dashed lane dividers is faded but still discernible.
Officer Schwecke had legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Trottier.

(ALS R. p. 061)
5

It is appropriate for the Administrative Hearing Examiner to have made common sense judgments and inferences
about human behavior even though he does not set those out in his Findings, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 at
125, 120S.Ct. 673 (2000).
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The analysis of legal cause in the Administrative License Suspension setting is discussed
by the Court of Appeals in the In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937,
155P.3d1176 (Ct. App. 2006). 6

Trooper Schwecke clearly has a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop of Mr.
Trottier' s vehicle based upon the observed driving and driving recorded with his onboard video
recording equipment (ALS Exhibit A). 7
The conduct observed by Trooper Schwecke does not fall within the broad range of what
can be described as normal driving behavior given the statutory provisions of LC. § 49-644(1 ).
It is clear from the video recording that Mr. Trottier did not approach a right hand turn

and make a right hand turn as close as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway
as required by LC. § 49-644.
The lack of testimony from Mr. Trottier does not offer for the Administrative Hearing
Examiner a potential factual alternative explanation as to why it was not "practicable" for Mr.
Trottier to make a turn as close to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway, In re Gib bar at p.

A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128
Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer
may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior ifthere is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho
205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999).

In re Suspension of Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Jdaho 937, 942-43, 155 P.3d 1176, 1181-82 (Ct. App. 2006).
7

The time of night, 2:20 a.m. and the neighborhood in which the stop occurred are also circumstances from which
Trooper Schwecke could draw based upon his experience as a Patrol Officer demonstrating a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.
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948). Instead Mr. Trottier simply asks the Court to come to a contrary factual conclusion to that

made by the Administrative Hearing Examiner.
Trooper Schwecke's suspicion that the operator of the motor vehicle immediately in front
of him has "committed or is about to commit to a crime" does not require Trooper Schwecke to
follow Mr. Trottier to develop more legal cause than Trooper Schwecke has at his disposal.
Trooper Schwecke observes a motor vehicle making an inappropriate right hand turn not as close
as practicable to the right hand curb or edge of the roadway. 8
The Hearing Examiner's decision is based on such relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept to support his conclusion, Masterson v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho
126, 244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010). 9

The Hearing Examiner's Decision is based on something more than a "scintilla but less
than a preponderance" (Masterson at 627). The District Court's standard of judicial review here
eliminates the appropriate deference to the factual analysis and conclusions of the Department's
Hearing Examiner, I.C. § 67-5277. The District Court's standard of Judicial Review does not
offer judicial review of the Hearing Examiner's Decision instead the Court substitutes its own
factual findings for those of the Hearing Examiner, LC. § 67-5279(1).

8

Here, there is probable cause for the stop of Mr. Trottier's motor vehicle based upon the video recording and
consistent with Trooper Schwecke's observation that Mr. Trottier made a turn inconsistent with that required of him
pursuant to I.C. § 49-644(1). See Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 942-43, 155P.3d1176, 1181-82 (Ct. App. 2006).

In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where
there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Ed. of
Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion. Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990). Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id.

Masterson v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 150Idaho126, 128, 244 P.3d 625, 627 (Ct. App. 2010)
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Here, the Decision of the Hearing Examiner has a factual basis, however, the District
Court instead of reviewing that factual basis through the prism of deference to the Hearing
Examiner, the District Court conducts its own factual analysis contrary to I.C. § 67-5279. The
findings made by the District Court on the record clearly substitute the Court's factual finding
for the Hearing Examiner's factual findings (Tr. p. 40 LL. 20-24).
The Hearing Examiner indicates that he observed what he characterized as a wide turn
and that the paint on the lane dividers was faded but still discernible (ALS R. p. 61).
The Hearing Examiner finding that Mr. Trottier made a wide turn and that the paint on
the lane dividers was faded but observable are appropriate findings from Trooper Schwecke's
sworn statement (ALS R. p. 031-034). There is no contrary testimony. Those findings are also
appropriate based upon the review of the video recording (ALS Exhibit A).
The District Court only applies IC § 49-63 7 to the facts of the stop of Mr Trottier (Tr. p.
40 LL. 13-20). The Court does not analyze the application of I.C. § 49-644 to these facts.
Trooper Schwecke indicates in his sworn statement that he is making a traffic stop based on the
inappropriate tum onto Main Street by Mr. Trottier.
It is clear from the videotape that Mr. Trottier's vehicle is in the middle of Main Street,

demonstrating that Mr. Trottier did not make a right tum staying as close to the right-hand curb
as is practicable (ALS Exhibit A at 2:10:33).
The analysis of the District Court does not fulfill the District Court's role of judicial
review, I.C. § 67-5279.

Instead the Court is making its own factual determination not

considering whether there is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence
supporting the Hearing Examiner's Findings.
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Just as Mr. Trottier can argue that he can't see a wide turn and a return to his lane of
travel by reviewing the video tape, another person looking at the same videotape can conclude
that Mr. Trottier's vehicle is in the middle of Main Street not in the curbside lane as required by
LC. § 49-644. That differing view indicates that there is more than a scintilla of evidence. '

0

The District Court instead of determining whether there is a basis in the Record for the
Hearing Examiner's conclusion, makes his own conclusion. 11
The Court suggests that the painted lane dividers are not clearly marked because others
have driven in the way that Trooper Schwecke observes Mr. Trottier drove and concludes that if
everybody is doing it then it's not suspicious behavior outside the range of normal driving.

JO

" When we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists we are precluded
from substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight of testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.").
See State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 582, 588, 149 P.3d 857, 863 (Ct.App.2006).
II

21
22
23
24

The DVD shows Mr. Trottier driving out of the
parking lot around the pickup that is nearest to the curb in
what looks to me to be as practicable as possible way. I
don't see him driving over the centerline.

Tr. of Appellate Argument p. 40 LL. 21-24
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Instead of the appropriate deference that should be given the Hearing Examiner's
Decision, the District Court considers information that is clearly not part of the Record, clearly
has not been argued by Mr. Trottier and was not considered by the Department's Hearing
Examiner. 12
Clearly the Court is substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Hearing Examiner.
There is no evidence in the Record that the condition of the painted lane dividers law makers in
any way attributable to the operation of a motor vehicle contrary to LC. § 49-637 or LC. § 49644.
The question is not what the District Court can see, the question is what the Hearing
Examiner saw. If there is a reasonable basis in the record for the Hearing Examiner's findings
then the District Court must give deference to the Hearing Examiner's Decision. LC. § 67-5279.
The Hearing Examiner indicated what testimony he considered, how he made this decision and
circumstances of his conclusion accepting Trooper Schwecke's sworn statement along with his
view of the videotape to conclude that Mr. Trottier did not meet his burden to show that Officer
Schwecke did not have legal cause for the motor vehicle stop. 13
Put another way, Hearing Examiner's findings indicate what information the Hearing
Examiner considered, what weight was placed on that evidence by the Hearing Examiner and
how the Hearing Examiner deliberated to the conclusions made by him. The Hearing Examiner
12

8
9
I0
11
12

... And to the extent that they're not clearly
marked, it suggests to me that others drove in the way that
Schwecke thinks that Mr. Trottier drove and therefore if
everybody is doing it, it's not a reasonable and articulable
suspicious behavior that would justify being stopped.

Tr. p. 41 LL. 8-12.
13

The Court of Appeals recently, even after finding that some of the Department's Hearing Examiner's Findings
were not supported by the Record concluded that the driver had not met her burden, In re Hubbard, 152 Idaho 879,
276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012).
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clearly made factual determinations supported by the Record and which are binding on the
reviewing Court.

Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000),

Marshall v. Department ofTransp. 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct. App. 2002).
If the argument is that the Video recording is an inconclusive demonstration of whether

Mr. Trottier actually made a right tum that did not stay as close as practical to the right curb
edge, the record still contains the umefuted sworn statement of Trooper Schwecke of his
observations and Mr. Trottier has not met his burden.
The Department's Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Trooper Schwecke had legal
cause to stop the vehicle operated by Mr. Trottier is supported by substantial evidence in the
Record. If the video recording is inconclusive then Mr. Trottier has not met his burden to show
that there was not legal cause for the stop of Mr. Trottier.
The District Court erred when it set aside the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decision of the Department's Hearing Examiner. The District Court is required to consider
the Record that exists and not substitute its opinion for the opinion of the Department's Hearing
Examiner. When the District Court does so, this Court on appeal is free to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence in the Record to support the Hearing Examiner's Decision.
Other issues were raised by Mr. Trottier below. Specifically the District Court did not
reach the question of whether the tests for alcohol concentration were satisfactorily administered
by Officer Schwecke.
The Hearing Examiner's Decision is supported by substantial competent evidence in the
Record and should be sustained.
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B. Commercial Driver's License Disqualification

Mr. Trottier argued before the Idaho Transportation Department's Hearing Examiner that
Mr. Trottier should be entitled to the benefit of the stay of the Commercial Driver's License
Disqualification administrative action as a result of the Stay entered by the District Court in the
judicial review of Mr. Trottier' s Administrative License Suspension. Mr. Trottier further argued
to the Hearing Examiner that the Idaho Transportation Department was in violation of the
Court's stay entered in Mr. Trottier's Judicial Review of the Administrative License Suspension
of Mr. Trottier's driving privileges when proceeding to disqualify Mr. Trottier's Commercial
Driving Privileges in a separate administrative process.
Mr. Trottier asked the District Court to take Judicial Notice of the Court's proceedings
and file in the Judicial review of the Administrative License Suspension of Mr. Trottier's driving
privileges.
The District Court did not reach any of the arguments made to the Department's Hearing
Examiner, concluding that since the ALS suspension was set aside there was no basis for a
lifetime disqualification pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(2). 14
This Court on appeal reviewing the Administrative Record de novo can determine
whether the CDL DQ Hearing Examiner acted properly, Marshall.
The question pursuant to I.C. § 49-335(4) is whether Mr. Trottier has Commercial
Driving Privileges, whether he had recently failed an evidentiary test for blood alcohol and
whether he had suffered a prior evidentiary test failure. The Hearing Examiner specifically finds

14

lfthe District Court was persuaded that the Department had violated its stay order, the District Court would have
addressed that "contemptible behavior".
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that Mr. Trottier has commercial driving privileges and had failed two evidentiary tests (R. p.
042). 15
There is no evidence submitted to the Hearing Examiner that Mr. Trottier did not fail the
pnor evidentiary test in Washington or that he did not suffer an unvacated Administrative
License Suspension at the time of the CDL DQ Administrative Hearing.
It is not a violation of due process for the Hearing Examiner m disqualifying Mr.

Trottier's Commercial Driving privileges to make a decision based on the Department's Record
(IDAPA 04.11.01.600).
At the time of the CDL DQ Hearing there was no showing by Mr. Trottier that the
Administrative License Suspension pursuant to J.C. § 18-8002A had been vacated.
Mr. Trottier argues that the Department's conduct of an Administrative Hearing in
connection with Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges is in violation of the Stay entered
in an entirely different case where Mr. Trottier requested Judicial Review of an Administrative
License Suspension pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A. Clearly, there is nothing in the language of the
Stay in the Administrative License Suspension case that prohibits the Department from taking
any other action in connection with Mr. Trottier' s driving privileges other than the consequences
he would suffer under the Administrative License Suspension. 16
The Department does not violate the Court's stay in the Judicial Review of the
Administrative License Suspension of Mr. Trottier's Driving Privileges when it proceeds to
15

Records of the Department demonstrates that respondent failed a test to determine the driver's
alcohol concentration administered by a police officer on or about July 2, 2009, the State of
Washington and again on September 3, 2011, in Latah County, State ofldaho. All of the incidents
were while the respondent was operating a non-commercial vehicle.
Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary

Order,~

16

1, p. 1, Rp. 042.

For example, if Mr. Trottier had suffered a reckless driving conviction pursuant to LC. § 49-1501 would Mr.
Trottier argue that the Department could not independently suspend Mr. Trottier's Driving Privileges.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

16

address the unique driving privileges Mr. Trottier has as a Commercial Driver. The Idaho Court
has clearly indicated that the Commercial Driving Privileges Disqualification action is separate
and distinct from the Administrative License Suspension action, Wanner v. State, Dept. of

Transp. 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250 (2011), Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257,
254P.3d1253 (2011).
The Court does not stay the Idaho Transportation Department from additional
proceedings involving Mr. Trottier's driving privileges in the Administrative License Suspension
case, only the implementation of the Administrative License Suspension as a result of the failed
evidentiary test is stayed.

Any subsequent action by the Idaho Transportation Department

regarding the Disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial driving privileges should proceed.
In particular, the Legislature has addressed what can be considered by the Department for
purposes of the Commercial Driving Privileges disqualification:
For purposes of disqualification or withdrawal of commercial vehicle driving
privileges only, "conviction" means an unvacated adjudication of guilt, or
determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a
court of original jurisdiction or by an authorized administrative tribunal, an
unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's
appearance in court, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court, the
payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail,
regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended or probated.
(Emphasis added.)
Idaho Code§ 49-104(14)(b). 17
There is no violation of the Court's stay in the LC. § l 8-8002A Administration License
Suspension Judicial Review as a result of the Department's proceeding with the disqualification
of Mr. Trottier's privileges to operate a commercial vehicle pursuant to LC.§ 49-335.
17

Should the Court vacate the Administrative License Suspension, pursuant to the definition of conviction, the
Department would not have two "convictions" for purposes of a lifetime disqualification of Mr. Trottier's privileges
to operate a Commercial Vehicle.
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Neither is there a procedural due process violation. Mr. Trottier received "an opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner" Mathews v. Eldridge 424 US. 319 at
333 (1976). There are sufficient procedural protections in place based upon the process provided
Mr. Trottier regarding the disqualification of Mr. Trottier's privileges to operate a Commercial
Motor Vehicle. 18
Here Mr. Trottier was given notice of a hearing, had competent counsel appear on his
behalf and was aware of what information had been provided by the Department for purposes of
creating the initial Record.
The Mathews standard is clearly met with the Department providing Mr. Trottier with a
hearing before a neutral and disinterested Hearing Examiner. 19
The balancing required of the Mathews factors clearly indicates no procedural deficiency.
The private interest here is Mr. Trottier' s Commercial Driving Privileges. There is little risk of
an "erroneous deprivation" based on the process provided Mr. Trottier. Mr. Trottier offers no
additional procedural safeguards for the Court's consideration.

Mr. Trottier argues for a

different process requiring considerable time between the Administrative License Suspension
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A and the Commercial Driving Privileges pursuant to I.C. § 49-335.
Specifically, the Idaho Court has never found the Department's administrative hearing
process to be constitutionally suspect, In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gibbar, 143 Idaho

18

Due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed 2d 18 (1976).
19

No challenge has been made the that Hearing Examiner was biased or otherwise unduly influenced.
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937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006), also see Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 164,
244 P.3d 1250 (2010), Buell v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp. 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (2011) and

most recently In re Williams, --- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 3068793. 20
The Hearing Examiner was not encouraged to come to a different conclusion and was not
presented evidence or authority as to why the Hearing Examiner should not rely on the Idaho
Transportation Department's Records that prior evidentiary tests for breath alcohol had been
failed by Mr. Trottier.
The Public interest implicated here is substantial.

The Idaho Courts considering the

Mathews factors in the context of Administrative License Suspension hearings have found a

substantial public interest, Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dept. 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (2011). 21
Further, the Department has an interest in the implementation of its governing statutes.
Mr. Trottier really just makes a policy argument that the Idaho Transportation
Department should not disqualify Mr. Trottier from the operation of a Commercial Motor

20

The Court recently determined that the lifetime CDL DQ process does not violate due process and is not cruel and
unusual punishment, Jn re Williams, --- P.3d ---, 2012 WL 3068793.

21

Idaho's appellate courts have considered the Mathews factors in the context of administrative
license suspension hearings and have found that while an individual does have a substantial
interest in his or her license, that interest may be subordinated by the State's interest in preventing
intoxicated persons from driving, particularly where the individual is entitled to review
procedures. See Ankney, 109 Idaho at 4-5, 704 P.2d at 336-37 (concluding that the thenapplicable statute, I.C. § 49-352, which enabled a police officer to seize a person's driver's license
prior to a hearing, did not violate procedural due process because there was not a high risk of
erroneous deprivation where the statute provided for a prompt post-seizure review, coupled with
the requirement that the police officer requesting the evidentiary test have reasonable grounds to
believe the driver is intoxicated); see also In re McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, I90-9 l, 804 P.2d 9I1,
919-20 (Ct.App. l 990) (concluding that the notice provided by the advisory form, as set forth in
the applicable statute, did not violate the driver's procedural due process).

Bellv. Idaho Transp. Dept., 151Idaho659, 262P.3d1030, 1036 (2011).
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Vehicle based on his failure of two evidentiary tests. That Legislative decision to disqualify Mr.
Trottier's Commercial driving privileges is not before the Court.
Mr. Trottier does not have a "substantial right" in a different hearing process without
offering to the Court a showing of how the hearing should be conducted differently, particularly
considering that Mr. Trottier had the burden. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 495,

95 P.3d 977 (2004).
The only alternative implicitly suggested by Mr. Trottier is delaying the Commercial
Driving License disqualification until the Administrative License Suspension has run its course.
Mr. Trottier in the worst case would have gone through an appellate court's
determination that the Administrative License Suspension was a valid "conviction" and then
several years later would get notice that the Idaho Transportation Department was going to
disqualify him from the operation of a Commercial vehicle.
The Idaho Court in Wanner v. State, Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250

(2010), Buell v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 151 Idaho 257, 254 P.3d 1253 (2011) and now In re
Williams, ---P.3d---, 2012 WL 3068793 have not found the Idaho Transportation Department's
process to be unconstitutional.
Here the Record reflects that Mr. Trottier had Commercial Driving Privileges and failed
multiple evidentiary tests for breath alcohol.
Mr. Trottier received an opportunity to be heard, at a reasonable time, in a meaningful
manner, receiving such process due him Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893,

903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).
Finally, Mr. Trottier requested the District Court take Judicial Notice of the proceedings
m the Administrative License Suspension case.
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This action would create a record in the

disqualification of Mr. Trottier's Commercial Driving Privileges that does not exist before the
Department's Hearing Examiner. Without seeking leave to supplement the Record as provided
for by Idaho Code§ 67-5272, the District Court's enlargement of the Record to include matters
not considered by the Hearing Examiner would be entirely inappropriate and not supported by
the Administrative Procedures Act.
Mr. Trottier has not met his burden. Mr. Trottier has received the process due him. The
Hearing Examiner's Findings and Conclusions are based on substantial evidence in the record
and should be confirmed by the Court. Mr. Trottier should be disqualified from the operation of
a commercial vehicle for his lifetime.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Appellate Court should issue its Remittitur to the Department to implement the
administrative action taken by the Department, IRCP 84(t)(4).
Upon the reinstatement of the Hearing Examiner's Decision in the Administrative
License Suspension, the Commercial Driving License Disqualification should also be reinstated.
Mr. Trottier should suffer an Administrative License Suspension of all of his driving
privileges, pursuant to I. C. § 18-8002A(7).

Mr. Trottier should also suffer a lifetime

disqualification of his Commercial Driving Privileges pursuant to I.C. § 49-335 retaining the
remainder of his driving privileges.
Respectfully Submitted this __ day of August 2012.

Edwin L. Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX 1
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Section

[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 49, Volume 5]
[Revised as of October 1, 2010]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 49CFR383.51)
[Page 197)
TITLE 49--TRANSPORTATION
CHAPTER III--FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
PART 383_COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE STANDARDS; REQUIREMENTS AND PENALTIES--Table of Contents
Subpart D_Driver Disqualifications and Penalties
Sec. 383.51

Disqualifications of Drivers.

* * * * *
(c)

•

•

•

Table 2 to Sec.

If the driver operates a motor
vehicle and is convicted of:

(9) violating a State or local
law or ordinance on motor
vehicle traffic control
prohibiting texting while
driving.\2\

For a second
conviction of any
combination of
offenses in this
Table in a
separate incident
within a 3-year
period while
operating a CMV, a
person required to
have a CDL and a
CDL holder must be
disqualified from
operating a CMV
for . . .

60 days . . . . . . . . . . .

383.51

For a second
conviction of any
combination of
offenses in this
Table in a
separate incident
within a 3-year
period while
operating a nonCMV, a CDL holder
must be
disqualified from
operating a CMV,
if the conviction
results in the
revocation,
cancellation, or
suspension of the
CDL holder's
license or non-CMV
driving
privileges, for .

...

Not applicable ....

For a third or
subsequent
conviction of any
combination of
offenses in this
Table in a
separate incident
within a 3-year
period while
operating a CMV, a
person required to
have a CDL and a
CDL holder must be
disqualified from
operating a CMV
for . . .

120 days . . . . . . . . . .

For a third or
subsequent
conviction of any
combination of
offenses in this
Table in a
separate incident
within a 3-year
period while
operating a nonCMV, a CDL holder
must be
disqualified from
operating a CMV,
if the conviction
results in the
revocation,
cancellation, or
suspension of the
CDL holder's
license or non-CMV
driving
privileges, for .

Not applicable.

• • • • *
\2\ Driving, for the purpose of this disqualification, means operating a commercial motor vehicle, with the
motor running, including while temporarily stationary because of traffic, a traffic control device, or other
momentary delays. Driving does not include operating a commercial motor vehicle with or without the motor
running when the driver has moved the vehicle to the side of, or off, a highway, as defined in 49 CFR 390.5,
and has halted in a location where the vehicle can safely remain stationary.

* • * • *

er, the added text is set forth as follows: [[Page 197]]
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Title 49: Transportation
PART 383-COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE SlANDARDS; REQUIREl\IENTS AND PENAL11ES
Subpart D-Driver Disqualifications and Penalties
Browse Next

§ 383.51 Disqualification of drivers.
(a) General. (1) A person required to have a CLP or COL Wio is disqualified must not drive a CMV.
(2) An employer must not knolMngly allow, require, permit, or authorize a dri-.er who is disqualified to
drive a CMV.
(3) A holder of a CLP or COL is subj:lct to disqualification sanctions designated in par"!)raphs (b) and (c)
of this section, ifthe holder drives a CMV or non-CMV and is convicted of the violations listed in th:Jse
paragraphs.
(4) Determining first and subsequmt violations. For purposes of determining first and subsequent
violations of the offenses specified in this subpart, each convction for any offense listed in Tables 1
through 4 to this section resl.lting from a separate incident, Wiether committed in a CMV or non-CMV,
must be counted.

(5) The disqualification period must be in addition to any other previous periods of disqualification.
(6) Reinstatement after lifetime disqwlification. A State may reinstate any driver disqualified for life for
offenses described in pcragraphs (b)(1) through (8) ofthis section (Table 1 to §383.51) after 10 years, if
that person has \Qfuntarily entered and successfJlly completed an appropriate rehabilitation program
approved by the State. Any person Wlo has been reinstated in accordarce with this provision and Wlo
is subsequently convicted of a disqualifying offense described in paragraph> (b)(1) through (8) of this
section (Table 1 to §383.51) must not be reinstated.

(b) Disqualification for major offenses. Table 1 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses and periods br
which a person Wio is required to have a CLP or COL is disqualifed, depending upon the type of vehicle
the driver is operating at the time of the violation, as follows:

Table 1 to §383.51

For a first
conviction
or refusal to
be tested
while
operating a
For a
CMV
second·
transporting conviction

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=e5b8b5 55 8b56a3c2c1 a44dc2160a...
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For a first
conviction
or refusal to
be tested
while
operating a
CMV,a
person
required to
have a CLP
or COL and
a CLP or
COL holder
must be
disqualified
If a driver
from
operates a
motor vehicle operating a
CMV for
and is
* * *
convicted of:
1 year
(1) Being
under the
influence of
alcohol as
prescribed by
State law

For a first
conviction
or refusal to
be tested
while
operating a
non-CMV, a
CLP or COL
holder must
be
disqualified
from
operating a
CMV for

hazardous
materials
required to
be
placarded
under the
Hazardous
Materials
Regulations
(49 CFR part
172, subpart
F), a person
required to
have a CLP
or COL and
a CLP or
COL holder
must be
disqualified
from
operating a
CMV for

or refusal to
be tested in
a separate
incident of
any
combination
of offenses
in this Table
while
operating a
CMV,a
person
required to
have a CLP
or COL and
a CLP or
COL holder
must be
disqualified
from
operating a
CMV for

* * *

* * *

* * *

Fora
second
conviction
or refusal to
be tested in
a separate
incident of
any
combination
of offenses
in this Table
while
operating a
non-CMV, a
CLP or COL
holder must
be
disqualified
from
operating a
CMV for
* * *

1 year

3 years

Life

Life.

1 year

3 years

Life

Life.

Not
applicable

3 years

Life

Not
applicable.

1 year

3 years

Life

Life.

* * *

(2) Being
under the
influence of a
controlled
substance

1 year

* * *

(3) Having an 1 year
alcohol
concentration
of 0.04 or
greater while
operating a
CMV * * *
(4) Refusing to 1 year
take an
alcohol test as
required by a
State or
jurisdiction
under its
implied

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=e5b8b5558b56a3c2c1 a44dc2160a. .. 1/24/2012

Page 3 ofY

Electronic Code of Federal Regulations:

consent laws
or regulations
as defined in
§383. 72 of this
part * * *
1 year
(5) Leaving
the scene of
an accident
* * *
(6) Using the 1 year
vehicle to
commit a
felony, other
than a felony
described in
paragraph (b)
(9) of this table
* * *
1 year
(7) Driving a
CMVwhen, as
a result of
prior violations
committed
operating a
CMV, the
driver's COL is
revoked,
suspended, or
canceled, or
the driver is
di sq ua lified
from operating
aCMV
(8) Causing a 1 year
fatality through
the negligent
operation of a
CMV,
including but
not limited to
the crimes of
motor vehicle
manslaughter,
homicide by
motor vehicle
and negligent
homicide
(9) Using the Life-not
vehicle in the eligible for
commission of 10-year

1 year

3 years

Life

Life.

1 year

3 years

Life

Life.

Not
applicable

3 years.

Life

Not
applicable.

Not
applicable

3 years

Life

Not
applicable.

Life-not
eligible for
10-year

Life-not
eligible for
10-year

Life-not
eligible for
10-year

Life-not
eligible for
10-year
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a felony
reinstatement reinstatement reinstatement reinstatement reinstatement
involving
manufacturing,
distributing, or
dispensing a
controlled
substance
* * *
(c) Disqualification for serious traffic viofatiom. Table 2 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses and the
periods for which a person Wio is required to have a CLP or CDL is disqualifed, depending upon the
type of vehicle the driver is operating at the time of the violation, as follows:
Table 2 to §383.51

For a third or
subsequent
For a second
conviction
of
conviction of
any
any
combination
combination
of offenses in
of offenses in
this Table in a
this Table in a
separate
separate
incident
For a third or
incident
within a 3For a second within a 3subsequent
conviction of year period conviction of year period
any
while
any
while
combination operating a combination operating a
of offenses
non-CMV, a of offenses in non-CMV, a
in this Table CLP or COL this Table in CLP or COL
holder must
in a separate holder must
a separate
be
incident
be
incident
disqualified
within a 3disqualified
within a 3from
year period
from
year period
operating
a
while
operating a
while
CMV, if the
operating a
CMV, if the
operating a
conviction
CMV,a
conviction
CMV,a
results in the
person
results in the
person
revocation,
required to
revocation,
required to
have a CLP cancellation, have a CLP cancellation,
or COL and a
or
or
or COL and a
CLP or COL suspension of CLP or COL suspension of
the CLP or
holder must
the CLP or
holder must
COL holder's
COL holder's
be
be
If the driver disqualified
license or
license or
disqualified
non-CMV
operates a
from
non-CMV
from
motor vehicle operating a
driving
driving
operating a
and is
privileges, for
CMVfor
privileges, for
CMVfor
* * *
* * *
* * *
convicted of:
* * *
(1) Speeding 60 days
120 days.
60_ days
120 days
excessively,
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involving any
speed of 24.1
kmph (15
mph) or more
above the
posted speed
limit
(2) Driving
60 days
recklessly, as
defined by
State or local
law or
regulation,
including but,
not limited to,
offenses of
driving a motor
vehicle in
willful or
wanton
disregard for
the safety of
persons or
property
(3) Making
60 days
improper or
erratic traffic
lane changes
(4) Following 60 days
the vehicle
ahead too
closely
(5) Violating
60 days
State or local
law relating to
motor vehicle
traffic control
(other than a
parking
violation)
arising in
connection
with a fatal
accident
(6) Driving a
60 days
CMVwithout
obtaining a
COL
60 days
(7) Driving a.
CMV without a

60 days

120 days

120 days.

60 days

120 days

120 days.

60 days

120 days

120 days.

60 days

120 days

120 days.

Not applicable 120 days

Not

appli~able

120 days

Not applicable.

Not applicable.
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COL in the
driver's
possession 1
(8) Driving a
60 days
CMV without
the proper
class of COL
and/or
endorsements
for the specific
vehicle group
being operated
or for the
passengers or
type of cargo
being
transported
(9) Violating a 60 days
State or local
law or
ordinance on
motor vehicle
traffic control
prohibiting
texting while
driving. 2
(10) Violating 60 days
a State or local
law or
ordinance on
motor vehicle
traffic control
restricting or
prohibiting the
use of a handheld mobile
telephone
while driving a
CMV. 2

Not applicable 120 days

Not applicable.

Not applicable 120 days

Not applicable.

Not applicable 120 days

Not applicable.

1Any individual who provides proof to the enforcement authority that issued the citation, bythe date the
individual must appear in crurt or pay any fine for such a violation, that the indi\4dual held a valid COL
on the date the citaticn was issued, shall not be guilty of this offense.

2 Driving, for the purpose of this disqualification, means operating a commercial motor vehicle on a
highway, including v.hile temporarily stationary because oftraffic, a traffic control device, or other
momentary delays. Driving does nct include operating a conmercial motor vehicle when the dri\1er has
moved the vehicle to the side of, or off, a highway and has halted in a locati01 where the vehicle can
safely remain stationary.

(d) Disqualification for railroad-highway grade crossing offenses. Table 3 to §383.51 cortains a list of the
offenses and the peria:ls for which a person l.\ho is required to ha-.e a CLP or COL is dsqualified, when

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=e5b8b5558b56a3c2cla44dc2160a... 1/24/2012
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the driver is operating a CMV at the time of the violation, as follows:

Table 3 to §383.51

For a first
conviction a
person
required to
have a CLP or
COL and a CLP
or COL holder
must be
disqualified
from operating
a CMV for

If the driver is
convicted of
operating a
CMVin
violation of a
Federal, State
or local law
because * * *.
* * *
(1) The driver is No less than 60
days
not required to
always stop, but
fails to slow
down and check
that tracks are
clear of an
approaching
train * * *
(2) The driver is No less than 60
not required to
days
always stop, but
fails to stop
before reaching
the crossing, if
the tracks are
not clear * * *
(3) The driver is No less than 60
always required days
to stop, but fails
to stop before
driving onto the
crossing * * *
(4) The driver
No less than 60
fails to have
days
sufficient space
to drive
completely
through the
crossing without
stopping * * *

For a third or
subsequent
For a second
conviction of any conviction of any
combination of
combination of
offenses
in this
offenses in this
Table in a separate Table in a separate
incident within a 3- incident within a 3year period, a
year period, a
person required to person required to
have a CLP or COL have a CLP or COL
and a CLP or COL and a CLP or COL
holder must be
holder must be
disqualified from
disqualified from
operating a CMV
operating a CMV
for * * *
for * * *
No less than 1 year.
No less than 120
days

No less than 120
days

No less than 1 year.

No less than 120
days

No less than 1 year.

No less than 120
days

No less than 1 year.
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(5) The driver
fails to obey a
traffic control
device or the
directions of an
enforcement
official at the
crossing * * *
(6) The driver
fails to negotiate
a crossing
because of
insufficient
undercarriage
clearance * * *
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No less than 60 No less than 120
days
days

No less than 1 year.

No less than 60 No less than 120
days
days

No less than 1 year.

(e) Disqualification for violating oLi-of-service orders. Table 4 to §383.51 contains a list ofthe offenses
and periods br which a person who is required to ha-.e a CLP or COL is disqualifed when the driver is
operating a CM\/ at the time of the violation, as follows:
TABLE 4 TO §383.51

For a third or
subsequent
For a second
conviction in a
For a first
conviction in a
conviction
separate incident separate incident
while operating within a 10-year within a 10-year
period while
a CMV, a
period while
person
operating a CMV, operating a CMV,
a person required
required to
a person
have a CLP or required to have to have a CLP or
COL and a CLP
COL and a CLP a CLP or COL
or COL holder
or COL holder
and a CLP or
If the driver
must be
COL holder must
must be
operates a CMV
disqualified
be disqualified disqualified from
and is convicted of from operating from operating a operating a CMV
a CMVfor * * * CMVfor * * *
* * *
for * * *
(1) Violating a driver No less than 180 No less than 2
No less than 3
years or more than
or vehicle out-ofyears or more
days or more
service order while than 1 year
than 5 years
5 years.
transporting
nonhazardous
materials
(2) Violating a driver No less than 180 No less than 3
No less than 3
years or more than
or vehicle out-ofyears or more
days or more
service order while than 2 years
5 years.
than 5 years
transporting
hazardous materials
required to be
placarded under part
172, subpart F of

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=e5b8b5558b56a3c2c1 a44dc2160a...
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this title, or while
operating a vehicle
designed to
transport 16 or more
passengers,
including the driver
[67 FR 49756, July31, 2002, as amended at 68 FR 4396, Jan. 29, 20CB; 72 FR 36787, July5, 2007; 75
FR 59134, Sept. 27, 2010; 76 FR 26879, M3y 9, 2011; 76 FR 75486, Dec. 4 2011]
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